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Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal 
Rules and Common Law 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
To the average lawyer it is Sanskrit; to the experienced federal practi­
tioner it is monopoly; to the author of text books on federal practice it 
is a golden harvest.1 
This description of federal practice and procedure under the Con­
formity Act of 18722 was an article of faith with those who labored for 
years to persuade Congress to replace that s tatute with an act empower­
ing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure for actions at 
law.3 The accuracy of the description was disputed by some members of 
the bar, of the judiciary, and of Congress during the entire period of that. 
long campaign .4 There would be little point in trying to determine who 
had the better of the debate, for even those who are interested in the 
history of American procedure and in the rhetoric of procedural reform 
are likely to be more interested in areas within the contemporary land­
scape of federal practice and procedure where yesterday's rhetoric is to­
day's reality. I propose to examine one such area, federal limitations law, 
where there is a distressing aptness for our s ituation in this rhetorical 
gem of another age. I will also argue that federal limitations law is not 
unique-that the description is  more broadly applicable-and suggest a 
s trategy for reform. But the occasion would not permit careful broad­
scale exploration, and perhaps the major lesson that I derive from this 
work is that the quest for broad-scale solutions is at times misdirected. 
Since the beginning of the Republic, the federal courts have s trug­
gled with the problem of limitations periods for federal statutes that do 
not specify the time within which a suit must be brought.5 Unable to fill 
the gaps with judge-made rules,  6 but unwilling to indulge the notion that 
© 1 988 Stephen B. Burbank 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I appreciate the comments of those at the Sym­
posium and of participants at the Legal Studies Seminar, University of Pennsylvania Law School, on 
various incarnations of this paper. As usual, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Frank Goodman, 
Seth Kreimer, Linda Silberman and Steve Subrin for wise suggestions and warm support. 
1 Report of the Committee on Uniform judicial Procedure , 46 A.B.A. REP. 46 1 , 466 ( 1 92 1 ) .  
2 Act ofjune l, 1 872, ch. 255, § 5, 1 7  Stat. 1 96, 197 .  
3 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 1 30 U. PA. L. REv. 1 0 1 5, 1 039-42 ( 1 982) .  
4 See id. at 1 04 1  nn. l 07- 1 08, 1 063-64, 1 083-84 n.296. 
5 See McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 ( 1 830) . See generally Special Project, Time Bars in 
Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CoRNELL L. 
REv. l O l l ( 1 980). 
6 See Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General 
Approach , 7 1  CoRNELL L. REV. 733, 769-70 ( 1 986); Currie, On Blazing Trails: judge Friendly and Federal 
jurisdiction, 1 33 U. PA. L. REv. 5, 6, 8 ( 1 984); Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 
HARV . L. REv. 1 7 1 7 ,  1 72 1  ( 1 982) .  "The length of a limitations period is arbitrary-you can't reason 
your way to it-and courts are supposed not to be arbitrary; when they are, they get criticized for it." 
Hemmings v.  Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1 987) .  
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a federal statutory claim is timeless ,  7 the federal courts found in the 
Rules of Decision Act' s reference to the "laws of the several states" the 
path ofleast resistance . 8 But it was hardly a clear path, as cases involving 
claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts demon­
strated. Whatever the role envisioned for the Rules of Decision Act at 
the time it was passed,9 how can a state statute of limitations plausibly be 
thought to "apply" in a case that the courts of the s tate are powerless to 
hear? 1 0  
Although Congress has in  some instances rescued the federal courts 
from this embarrassment, as in the Clayton Act, 1 1  the proliferation of 
federal statutory law and of implied rights of action in this century have 
combined to keep litigants and courts busy guessing, in a pale imitation 
of comparative law, what the most closely analogous state law i s .  I doubt 
that anybody would contend that such activity represents an optimal use 
of resources . It may be useful ,  however, to identify its costs . 1 2  
A regime of borrowed state limitations law imposes a variety o f  costs 
on litigants . Until such time as the most closely analogous state law has 
been authoritatively identified, a conscientious lawyer who has been con­
sulted about the possibility of commencing l itigation must b ecome con­
versant with multiple sources of substantive law 1 3-in the process ,  
identifying the pertinent choice o f  law rule.14 Having determined the 
most closely analogous body of state substantive law and its governing 
limitations provision, our hypothetical lawyer must consider whether, ap­
plied to the federal claim in question, that provision would be hostile to 
or inconsistent with the policies animating the federal statute or with fed-
7 See, e.g. , Wilson v .  Garcia, 47 1 U.S. 26 1 , 2 7 1  ( 1 985) ;  Campbell v. Haverhill ,  !55 U.S .  6 10, 6 1 6-
1 7  ( 1 895) ; Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 34 1 ( 1 805) . But see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.  
EEOC, 432 U.S.  355 ( 1 977) (refusing to borrow state statute of limitations for EEOC enforcement 
action). 
8 The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Consti­
tution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1 652 ( 1 982) .  
For a revisionist reading of the Court's cases by a justice who regards the Rules of Decision Act 
as redundant and who is willing to indulge the notion that a federal statutory claim is timeless, see 
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 1 07 S. Ct. 2759, 2767-74 ( 1 987) (Scalia ,]. ,  concur­
ring in judgment) . Revisionism is not, however, uncommon in this corner of the law. See DelCos­
tello v.  International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1 5 1  ( 1 983) ;  infra text accompanying note 8 1 .  
9 See Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 3 4 of the Judiciary Act of 17 89: The Example of 
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1 5 1 3  ( 1 984); Burbank, supra note 6, at 76 1 n.l2 1 .  
1 0  See Campbell v .  Haverhil l ,  1 55 U.S. 6 1 0, 6 1 4-20 ( 1 895) (state statute of limitations applied 
under Rules of Decision Act in federal patent action); Burbank, supra note 6, at 8 24 n .440. 
1 1  1 5  U.S.C. § 1 5b ( 1 982) .  See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp . ,  383 U.S. 696, 704 ( 1 966). 
1 2  Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 767-68 (costs of borrowed state preclusion law applied to federal 
question judgment of federal court). Compare id. at 8 1 1 - 1 2  (state court judgments) .  
1 3  See Agency Holding Corp. v .  Malley-Duff & Assoc., 1 07 S. Ct. 2759, 2763-64 ( 1 987) .  Compare 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. ,  1 07 S. Ct. 2 6 1 7 , 262 1 ( 1987) ( §  1 98 1  actions sound in tort) with id. at 
2625-3 1 (Brennan, J. ,  concurring in part and dissenting in part) (§ 1 98 1  actions sound in contract) .  
1 4  See Burbank, supra note 6 ,  at 768 ("[T]he constraints o n  choice of law applicable t o  the exer­
cise of diversity jurisdiction do not obtain outside of that context") .  See also University of Tenn. v. 
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 ( 1 986) (using a federal choice of law rule that, when uniform federal 
requirements are met, refers to the law of the rendering state to determine the preclusive effects of 
the unreviewed proceedings of a state administrative agency on a subsequent § 1 983 action in fed­
eral court) .  
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eral rights .15 This is likely to be a difficult, time-consuming, and expen­
sive process, and no less so for a conscientious defense lawyer. 
Moreover, neither the lawyers' unilateral research nor, if they disagree, 
their subsequent litigation on the question has anything to do with the 
merits of federal claims that might be or have been made in litigation. 
There may be some questions of federal law, uncertainty about which, at 
least for a time, benefits the federal system, 16 but limitations is not one of 
them. 17 
The difficulty of ascertaining the governing period in a system of 
borrowed state limitations law suggests that other, more significant, costs 
may be entailed .  Even a conscientious plaintiff 's  lawyer may prove to be 
wrong about the answer to the problem, and the costs of error may in­
clude the loss of the client 's  federal substantive rights . 18 If the client is 
risk averse, the most likely strategy in response will be (if possible) to 
bring suit within the shortest of all putatively applicable limitations peri­
ods . Such a strategy imposes costs of its own, driving into court griev­
ances that, in the ripeness of time, might never become disputes , 19 
increasing the incidence of frivolous claims, 20 and creating the possibility 
of duplicative litigation.2 1 From the perspective of putative defendants , 
uncertainty as to the governing limitations period is at war with the goal 
of repose that is thought to animate that body of law.22 
A regime of borrowed state limitations law also imposes costs on 
courts, both federal , and in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, state. The 
problem of finding the "right" period may be no less difficult for 
judges,23 and, depending on the quality of advocacy, it may be no less 
time-consuming. Again, that time is spent on a question unrelated to the 
merits of the litigation, one for which simplicity and predictability are 
traditionally thought a necessary, if not an adequate, answer to a charge 
of arbitrariness .  24 But in this instance, the charge cannot be laid at the 
1 5  See, e.g. , Occidental Life Ins. Co. v .  EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 ( 1 977) ("[I]t is the duty of the 
federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the 
implementation of national policies").  
16 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S.  1 54 ,  1 60 ( 1 984); S. EsTREICHER &J.  SEXTON, REDEFIN­
ING THE SuPREME CouRT's RoLE 48-52, 73-74 ( 1 986) . 
1 7  See Wilson v. Garcia, 4 7 1  U.S. 26 1 ,  272 ( 1985) ("uncertainty and time-consuming litigation"); 
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 ( 1 983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Few areas of the law 
stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of 
limitations"). See also Norris v .  Wirtz, 8 1 8  F.2d 1329, 1 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 08 S. Ct. 329 
( 1 987) . 
1 8  See Wilson v. Garcia, 4 7 1  U.S .  26 1 ,  275 n.34 ( 1 985) . By reason of the operation of preclusion 
rules, the rights lost may include rights, both federal and state, that were not asserted in the com­
plaint. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF jUDGMENTS § 25 comment e ( 1 982) .  
1 9  See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claim­
ing . .. , 1 5  LAw & Soc'v REv.  63 1 ( 1 980-8 1 ) .  
20 See FED. R. Crv. P. 1 1  advisory committee note (" [W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may 
depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer . . . .  ") .  
2 1  M y  hypothetical risk averse plaintiff may b e  forced to split her claim because part o f  i t  i s  not 
yet ripe. Imagine, for instance, a person who is not yet entitled to sue under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f) ( 1 982) . 
22 See Wilson v.  Garcia, 471 U.S.  2 6 1 ,  275 n.34 ( 1 985) . 
23  See supra note 1 3. 
24 In McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet. )  270 ( 1 830) , the Court stated: 
Of late years, the courts, in England and in this country, have considered statutes of limita­
tions more favorably than formerly. They rest upon sound policy and tend to the peace and 
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doorstep of the legislature.25 Moreover, because the process of finding 
the most closely analogous state law has the trappings of rationality, 
when itself revealed as arbitrary, it may detract from the appearance of 
j us tice under law that is important to continued respect for the institu­
tion of courts . 26 
Finally, some of the costs identified above and others to be  men­
tioned here should be viewed from the discrete perspective of the federal 
policies or interests sought to be advanced in the underlying substantive 
law. The inadvertent loss of a federal claim by a plaintiff whose lawyer, 
without fault, guessed wrong about the governing limitations period is 
one such cost. The existence of disuniform limitations periods for the 
same federal claim, depending on the state in which suit is brought, and 
difficult to explain or justify to a lay person, 27 is another. The problems 
of supervising a system of borrowed state limitations law, particularly 
acute in cases within concurrent jurisdiction, present a third . 28 The 
Supreme Court may feel pressure to allot a disproportionate amount of 
its precious docket to borrowed limitations cases, either to minimize in­
terstate disuniformity or to check the application of state statutes that are 
hostile to or inconsistent with federal rights . 
I believe that, in recent years , the Court has felt pressure on its 
docket from federal limitations cases .  In any event, the Court has 
evinced awareness of many of the costs imposed by a system of borrowed 
state limitations law. The Court appears to be following a number of 
different, but related, strategies to minimize these costs . 
First, the Court has made it clear that the search for analogies can 
include other federal substantive schemes as well as state substantive law, 
and that if the most closely analogous scheme with a limitations period is  
federal, that limitations period should be borrowed.29 Even when the 
welfare of society. The courts do not now, unless compelled by the force of former deci­
sions, give a strained construction, to evade the effect of those statutes. By requiring those 
who complain of injuries to seek redress by action at law, within a reasonable time, a salu­
tary vigilance is imposed, and an end is put to litigation. 
!d. at 278-79. Cf Miner v.  Atlass, 363 U.S.  64 1 ,  648-49 ( 1 960) ("So long as the time set be not 
unreasonable, it  is less important what the limit be than that there be a rule whereby some timetable 
may be known to the profession.") .  
2 5  Except in the case of rights of action implied by the courts, however, Congress can and should 
be criticized for failing to provide a limitations period in the statute. 
26 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 826 ("Even if the administrability of a system of borrowed state 
law were the only relevant consideration, one might well conclude that federal judges should not be 
distracted by the judicial equivalent of a wild goose chase.") .  But see Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 
688, 690 (7th Cir. 1 987) ("Of course, in deciding which statute of limitations to borrow, the court is 
choosing among arbitrary periods set by a legislature; but the choice itself is not arbitrary.") . 
Whether or not the process is arbitrary, it can entail the cost posited in the text if it engenders 
uncertainty that leads to the inadvertent loss of federal substantive rights. See supra note 1 8 ,  infra 
text accompanying notes 34-35. 
27 "Where legal rules are essentially arbitrary and cannot even be defended on grounds of sov­
ereign or institutional integrity, one who suffers their consequences is quick to sense inequitable 
administration of the law." Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 1 3 1  U. PA. L. REv. 283, 327 ( 1 982) .  Compare the application of 
disuniform state law for a federal claim when state interests are implicated. See, e.g., United States v.  
Kimbell Foods, Inc. ,  440 U.S. 7 1 5  ( 1 979) . 
28 Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 767-70 (administrability problems of borrowed state preclusion 
law applied to federal question judgment of federal court) . 
29 See De!Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1 5 1  ( 1 983) .  
[ 
( 
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plausibility of the federal alternative is subject to question, as it was in 
the Court's recent decision borrowing a limitations period found in the 
Clayton Act for civil RICO actions,30 the benefits of a uniform limitations 
per�od may appear sufficient, particularly considering the irreducible ar­
bitrariness of all limitations law, to carry the day. 
Second, in civil rights cases subject to 42 U .S.C. Section 1 988 ,  the 
Court has also attempted to minimize the costs of the borrowing process .  
By prescribing uniform federal characterizations o f  actions under 42 
U.S .C .  Section 1 98331 and 42 U .S.C.  Section 1981,32 the Court has re­
duced both the transaction costs for litigants and courts and the costs 
that errors by either entail for the federal system. 33 Of course, those 
characterizations are crude, but they could hardly be cruder than the as­
sumption that individually tailored solutions are always synonymous with 
just solutions .34 When limitations are at issue, the plaintiff may not be 
alive to wear the suit .  ss 
Third, the Court has addressed the problem of subsidiary rules that 
are part of the baggage of limitations law, rules that, for instance, deter­
mine when a limitations period begins to run, when it is suspended, and 
when it ceases to run. For a time it seemed that the Court was willing to 
rest with the perception that in the case of some such rules the trip is 
nothing without the baggage, that, in other words,  limitations periods 
should not be viewed, and thus not borrowed, in isolation.36 That per­
ception has recently been confirmed by Paul Carrington, whose analysis 
of modern limitations law makes the point that, in an age of discovery 
and other equitable doctrines, one often cannot tell a statute of limita­
tions by the statute. 37 
30 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987);  Comment, The 
Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U.  PA. L. 
REv. 1447 (1988) .  See also In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig ., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (borrow­
ing provisions from 1934 Securities Act for implied right of action); Reed v. United Transp. Union, 
828 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1987) ,  cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (borrowing provision in § 10(b) of 
National Labor Relations Act for claims under § 101 of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo­
sure Act) . 
31 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) . 
32 Goodman v. Lukens Steels Co., 107 S Ct. 2617 (1987). 
33 That is hardly to say, however, that these cases have solved all of the problems. See, e.g., 
Owens v .  Okure, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), art. granted, 108 S .  Ct. 1218 (1988) (choosing between 
different state statutes of limitations for intentional and unintentional personal injuries in section 
1983 action). 
34 Cf Federated Dep't Stores v.  Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (" 'Simple justice' is achieved 
when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doc­
trine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination 
of the equities in a particular case") .  See also infra text accompanying note 189. 
35 See, e.g., Goodman v .  Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2621-22 (1987) (2-year statute ap­
plied retroactively); Cannon v. Kroger Co. ,  837 F.2d 660, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (Murnaghan, J, 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (contending that "majority's new filing rule . . .  shouid 
not be applied retroactively") . See also Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No 
federal RICO litigant (plaintiff or defendant) could have had reasonable expectations about the ap­
plicable statute of limitations when this case arose, because the question of the applicable statute was 
(and is) intensely contested and highly uncertain."). 
36 See, e.g., Johnson v.  REA, 421 U.S.  454, 463-64 (1975) .  
37 SeeP. Carrington, An Appreciation of Walter Wheeler Cook, Erie and the Rules Enabling Act 
5-7 Qanuary 9, 1988) (unpublished remarks at Association of American Law Schools, Section on 
Civil Procedure). 
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Recently, however, the Court has become restless ,  and, with visions 
of uniformity dancing in their heads ,  the Justices have determined to be  
even more aggressive in seeking federal fillers for the gaps in federal 
limitations law. The issue before the Court in West v. Conrai/,38 or so it 
may have seemed, was selecting a rule to determine when a borrowed 
s tatute of limitations ceases to run on federal claims . The claims in ques­
tion were brought by a railroad employee against his employer, union, 
and union representative under the Railway Labor Act.39 The six-month 
limitations period governing them was borrowed from federal,  not state, 
law-the National Labor Relations Act40-in an extension of the drive 
toward uniformity that I have briefly described.4 1 Finding in the same 
s tatute a rule that required service within the six-month period, the dis­
trict court dismissed the action .  The Court of Appeals affirmed.42 
The Court announced in West that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure-"A civil action is  commenced by filing a complaint with 
the court"43-provides the rule for stopping limitations periods that are 
borrowed to fill gaps in federal law.44 Because the employee in West had 
38 1 07 S. Ct. 1 538 ( 1 987) . 
39 45 U.S .C.  § §  1 5 1 -88 ( 1 982) . 
40 Section 1 0(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: 
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such 
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such 
purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint 
stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a 
member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less 
than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue 
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of 
the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom 
such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such 
charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall 
be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may be amended by the 
member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time 
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have 
the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or 
otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion 
of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person 
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such 
proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evi­
dence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure 
for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28. 
29 u.s.c. § 1 60(b) ( 1982) . 
4 1  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously held that section l O(b) of the 
National Labor Relations Act governs a claim of unfair representation under the Railway Labor Act. 
Sisco v. Conrail, 732 F.2d 1 188, 1 193 (3d Cir. 1 984) . The court relied on DelCostello v .  Interna­
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 1 5 1  ( 1 983), which involved a hybrid action under the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S .C.  § 1 85 ( 1 982) . See supra text accompanying note 29. In West, 
the parties agreed that the same limitations period governs hybrid breach of contract/breach of the 
duty of fair representation claims under the Railway Labor Act, but neither the court of appeals nor 
the Supreme Court passed on the question. See West v.  Conrail, 780 F.2d 36 1 ,  362 (3d Cir. 1 985) ;  
West v.  Consolidated Rail Corp., 1 07 S Ct.  1 538, 1 54 1  n.2 ( 1 987) . 
42 West v.  Conrail, 780 F.2d 36 1 (3d Cir. 1 985) . 
43 FED. R. Ctv. P. 3 .  
44 Although we have not expressly so held before, we now hold that when the underlying 
cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of 
limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the ac­
tion is not barred if it has been "commenced" in compliance with Rule 3 within the bor­
rowed period. 
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filed his complaint within the six-month period, the Court reversed the 
decision below.45 So intent was the Court on extending uniformity to 
this subsidiary matter that i t  simply ignored the sources of its lawmaking 
authority. If that were all-if in this case, as in others in the progression, 
the obj ection were one of technique rather than result-the matter might 
be, as Paul Carrington has suggested i t  is ,46 merely of academic interest .  
But both the technique and the result in West are open to obj ection, and, 
in any event, academics are not the only people who should be 
interested. 
Since the Supreme Court 's 1 94 1  decision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. ,47 
neither courts nor commentators have evinced much interest in reconsid­
ering the restrictions imposed on Federal Rules by the Rules Enabling 
Act.48 In the case of the lower federal courts , this is not surprising. The 
rules in question are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and lower fed­
eral courts may assume, as the chairman of the original Advisory Com­
mittee guessed the bar would assume, " that the Court will s tand by its 
rules . "49 Indeed, in light of the failure of the Court to s trike down any 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure challenged in the intervening fifty years , 
experience confirms what psychology suggests . Even a judge or a court 
that believes there is always a first  time-or that there can be when the 
restrictions in question were intended to restrain those called upon to 
interpret them50-confronts ( 1 )  authoritative pronouncements that the 
Act's restrictions implement ,  and implement only, federalism concerns;5 1 
West v. Consolidated Rail Corp. ,  1 07 S. Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1  ( 1 987). See id. at 1 542 n.6 ("The governing 
principle is that we borrow only what is necessary to fill the gap left by Congress ." ) .  
45  /d. at 1 540, 1 542. 
46 SeeP. Carrington, supra note 37, at 2 1 -22 .  
47 3 1 2  u.s .  1 ( 1 94 1 ) .  
48 The Rules Enabling Act provides: 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of 
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts 
and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime 
cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by 
the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial 
review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and of­
ficers. 
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve 
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to 
the Constitution. 
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief 
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day 
of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported. 
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules 
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding, 
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the 
Supreme Court. 
28 U .S.C. § 2072 ( 1 982). See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 02 1 -23; Whitten, Erie and the Federal 
Rules: A Review and Reappraisal after Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 2 1  CREIGHTON 
L. REV. I, 1 -2 ,  42 ( 1 987) . 
49 Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Warren Olney, Jr. (January 1 5, 1 938) (Clark 
Papers, Sterling Library of Yale University, box 1 1 1 ,  folder 54) .  See Burbank, supra note 3,  at 1 1 34 
n.530. 
50 See Burbank, supra note 3,  at 1 10 1 -02. 
5 1  See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,  3 1 2  U.S. 1 , 9- 1 0  ( 1 94 1 ) ;  Hanna v .  Plumer, 380 U.S.  460, 465 
( 1965) ("The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal 
courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law."); id. at 4 7 1  ("both the En-
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(2) a so-called "test" for validity that, unless one is very careful, answers 
itself; 52 and (3) a presumption of validity that effectively passes the buck 
to Congress.53 
It is less easy either to explain or justify the failure of scholars to 
confront the Court's approach to the Enabling Act. To a considerable 
extent, I suspect, that failure was due for many years to vagaries in what I 
have misleadingly called the Court's "approach," and to fascination with 
Erie R. R. Co. v. Tom pkins, 54 a brooding omnipresence55 that was responsi­
ble for those vagaries and that, while it was omnipresent, rendered the 
Enabling Act a small point ar which to stick.56 
More recently, a distinguished scholar bucked this trend.57 He did 
so with such clarity, verve and style that those inclined to follow in his 
path may have failed to note that, in an otherwise valuable article dispel­
ling one myth, Professor Ely helped to entrench another. I speak of the 
myth of federalism, which would have us believe that, four years before 
Erie - when Swift v. Tyson 58 was in full flower - and in a statute author­
izing rules of practice and procedure for all civil litigation in the federal 
courts- litigation that even in the early 1930's involved predominantly 
questions of federal substantive law59-Congress was only concerned, or 
even primarily concerned, about the inappropriate displacement of state 
law.60 
As a historical matter, there can be no doubt that the major purpose 
of those who wrote and defended the bill that became the Enabling Act 
was to allocate power to make federal law prospectively between the 
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress, not to protect only lawmak­
ing that has already occurred, and certainly not to protect only state law. 
Such a purpose accommodates the reality that substantive rights are "en­
larged" when they are created for the first time in court rules. Although 
animated by concern for separation of powers, it also holds the potential 
abling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and 
federal 'procedural' law") . See also Burbank, supra note 3, at 1028-30, 1034-35. 
52 "The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforc­
ing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress 
for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I, 14 (1941). See Hanna v.  
Plumer, 380 U.S.  460, 464-65 (1965) . 
53 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S .  460, 4 71 (1965); see also Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 107 S. Ct. 
967, 970 (1987); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.  I, 15-16 (1941) . For criticism of the Court's 
reliance on the provision in the Enabling Act requiring proposed Federal Rules to lie before Con­
gress, see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1102, 1178-79, 1196 & n.779. For demonstration that the origi­
nal Advisory Committee relied on at least one principle of rulemaking (incorporation of existing 
federal law) that calls into question an essential predicate of the Court's presumption of validity, see 
id. at 1147-57. 
54 304 U.S.  64 (1938) .  
55 See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v .  Tompkins, 55  YALE 
L.J. 267 ( 1 946) . 
56 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1027-33, 1110-11 n.435. 
57 See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).  
58 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842).  
59 A study of civil cases in thirteen districts for the year ending June 30, 1930 revealed that 
jurisdiction in 77.7% of the cases was based only on the presence of the United States as a party or 
o n  the assertion of a federal question. AMERICAN L"'-W lNST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS O F  THE fED­
ERAL CouRTS, PART II, CIVIL CASES 47 (1931) . Diversity cases accounted for only 18.4% of the total. 
I d. 
60 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1033-35, II 06-12, 1122-25. 
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to serve federalism values , protecting both existing and potential state 
law by remitting to Congress the decision whether there shall be pro­
spective federal law on "substantive" matters and the content of that 
law.6 1 
For one who does not admit the relevance of the Enabling Act's leg­
islative his tory to its interpretation, both the Court's62 and Professor 
Ely's63 approaches to the Enabling Act should nevertheless pose an un­
comfortable dilemma: either their respective tests for validity of Federal 
Rules should be extended to a context-federal question cases-not con­
sidered by them, or the Enabling Act imposes no restrictions on supervi­
sory court rules in that context, at least no restrictions different from 
those the Constitution imposes on Congress in the area of federal 
procedure.64 
For one brief but hopeful moment a few years ago, it appeared that 
the Court would be required to reconsider i ts interpretation of the En­
abling Act in a federal question case .  In A1arek v. Chesny the Court of 
Appeals had refused to interpret Rule 68 so as to deny post-offer attor­
ney's fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff, relying alternatively on the 
s tatute governing fees in such cases and on the Enabling Act.65 More­
over, in an amicus brief the Solicitor General had referred to the legisla­
tive history that the Court has never acknowledged, let alone discussed . 
But the Court managed to sustain Rule 68 in Afarek without reference to 
the Enabling Act.66 
West is of a piece with Marek, but it is worse. The Court asserted the 
irrelevance of restrictions on its power to fashion federal common law for 
s tate law diversity cases that had driven i ts decision in Walker v. Arm co Steel 
Co . . 67 Fair enough. But the Court had also said in Walker that those re­
strictions were applicable only because Rule 3 does not as a matter of 
6 1  See id. a t  1 1 06- 14 .  1 1 2 1 -27. 
62 See supra note 52 and accompanyiPg text. 
63 See Ely, supra note 57, at 725-38 . See also Burbank, supra note 3, at I 1 23 nn.495-96. 
64 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 1 0. Dictum in a recent decision of the Court suggests that 
view. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Wolff & Co., 1 08 S. Ct. 404, 4 1 3  (1987) (suggesting that the Court 
could promulgate a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "authorizing service [of process] on an 
alien in a federal-question case"). But see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 72-73 n.673; Whitten, Separa­
tion of Powers Restrictions on judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 4 1  ( 1 988) ;  
infra note 186. 
65 See Chesny v. Marek, 420 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1 983), reu"d, 473 U.S.  1 ( 1 985) .  The attorney's 
fee statute at issue in Marek was the Civil Right's Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1 976, Pub. L. No. 
94-559, 90 Stat. 264 1 (codified at 42 U.S.C.  § 1 988 ( 1 982)) .  
66 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 ( 1 985); Bmbank, Proposals toAmendRu!.e68- Time toAbandon 
Ship, 1 9  U .  MICH. j.L. REF. 425, 433 n.42, 437-38 ( 1 986) . 
67 Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S.  740 ( 1 980). 
When the underlying cause of action is based on state law, and federal jurisdiction is based 
on diversity of citizenship, state law not only provides the appropriate period of limitations 
but also determines whether service must be effected within that period. Walker v. Annco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 ( 1 980) . Respect for the State's substantive decision that 
actual service is a component of the policies underlying the statute of limitations requires 
that the service rule in a diversity suit "be considered part and parcel of the statute of 
limitations ."  !d. at 752 (footnote omitted) . This requirement, naturally, does not apply to 
federal question cases. Indeed , Walker expressly declined to '"address the role of Rule 3 as 
a tolling provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal iaw or borrowed from 
state law, if the cause of action is based on federai iaw." !d. at 75 I n. ll. 
West v.  Conrail. l 07 S .  Ct. 1538, 1 541 n.4 (1987). 
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"plain meaning," and was not intended to, furnish what i t  called a "toll­
ing provision" for state statutes of limitations .68 With sleight of hand 
that s till leaves me blinking, the Court in West supplied a different "plain 
meaning" to Rule 3 for federal question cases69 and did not consider the 
Enabling Act problems that interpretation might be thought to present. 
In particular, the Court did not consider the fact that the original Advi­
sory Committee, in a Note which had been quoted in Walker, feared such 
problems in both federal question and diversity cases. 70 One is  left won­
dering after West whether the Court believes that there are any restric­
tions on Federal Rules in federal question cases . 
As this analysis may suggest,  it is considerably less important that we 
reach agreement about the implementation of the Enabling Act's restric­
tions on supervisory court rulemaking than that we agree on Congress' 
purposes in imposing those restrictions . The question whether the 
Enabling Act authorizes a Federal Rule defining when statutes of limita­
tions , federal or state, stop running is a detail . Having failed to acknowl­
edge the relevance of the Enabling Act in federal question cases, the 
Court in West obviously did not consider that detail .  If the Court had 
reached the question, its answer might have turned on the answer to an 
anterior question: whether a test for validity implementing restrictions 
allegedly imposed by Congress  for reasons that are not pertinent in fed­
eral question cases is plausible in such cases .7 1 If instead the Court had 
turned to the Enabling Act 's  legislative history, it is most unlikely that 
Rule 3 would have been sustained as a supplemental provision for stat­
utes of limitations, federal or state.72 
68 See Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & nn.9- l 0  ( 1 980) . 
69 To be sure, the Court in Walker had left open the question of "the role of Rule 3 as a tolling 
provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed from state law, if the 
cause of action is based on federal law." 446 U.S. at 75 1  n.ll . But neither in Walker nor in West did 
the Court explain how a Federal Rule can have two "plain meanings," and, as demonstrated below, 
the drafting history of Rule 3 is to the contrary. 
70 In Walker, the Court observed: 
"Rule 3 simply provides that an action is commenced by filing the complaint and has as its 
primary purpose the measuring of time periods that begin running from the date of com­
mencement; the rule does not state that filing tolls the statute of limitations." 4 C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1 057, p. l 9 1  ( 1 969) . 
The Note of the Advisory Committee on the Rules states: 
"When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question may arise 
under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute, or 
whether any further step is required, such as, service of the summons and complaint or 
their delivery to the marshal for service. The answer to this question may depend on 
whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of pro­
cedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations. 
The requirement of Rule 4 (a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it 
to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a question arising." 28 U.S.C. 
App., pp. 394-395. 
This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem which arose in 
Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not indicate, however, that Rule 3 was 
intended to serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only suggests 
that the Advisory Committee thought the rule might have that effect. 
446 U.S .  at 750 n. l O .  
7 1  See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
72 See Burbank, supra note 3 ,  at 1 1 58-60. 
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Court rules are not the only means by which the Supreme Court 
makes federal law. In a case like West ,  brought in federal court to adjudi­
cate federal substantive claims ,  there is undoubtably federal power to 
furnish all of the subsidiary rules , be they characterized as subs tantive or 
procedura1 .'3 Whether, in the absence of explicit congressional provi­
s ion or direction, the federal courts have the power to furnish those rules 
depends on one's approach to federal common law. 
As regards subsidiary rules of substantive law and " [l]egal rules 
which impact significantly upon the effectuation of legal rights , "74 the 
Court 's  approach seems to be that a finding of federal power usually en­
tails a conclusion of federal judicial power and that the question whether 
federal law shall be uniform or shall consist of state law borrowed as 
federal law is a matter of discretion. To be sure, in recent years the 
Court has provided guidance on the exercise of that discretion, the pur­
pose of which is to require more than mere rhetoric to justify the creation 
or application of uniformjudge-made rules. But, according to the Court, 
the guidelines are entirely a judicial construct.75 
The Court has yet to articulate or demonstrate a coherent approach 
to the common-law powers of federal courts for matters that, because 
they do not involve rules of substantive law or rules that " impact signifi­
cantly upon the effectuation of legal rights ,"  can without controversy be 
deemed procedural . Hanna v. Plumer may suggest that federal courts are 
free to formulate federal rules for, or apply them to, such matters , so 
long as they do not run afoul of the restrictions applicable in state law 
diversity cases . 76 
My own view is that the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to the 
circumstances in which federal courts can fashion or apply federal judge­
made rules, however they are characterized. When state law is found to 
apply, in a federal question case as well as in a state law diversity case, 
that result follows not because of judicial grace or borrowing, but be­
cause Congress has directed it .  
[T]here i s  n o  historical warrant for the suggestion that Erie 's constitu­
tional holding exhausts the Rules of Decision Act, whatever confusion 
about the reach of that holding may have followed in its wake. The Act 
is not confined to cases in which state law governs " of its own force . "  
Moreover, the language of the Act requires federal judges to justify 
federal common law by reference to a constitutional or s tatutory 
source that either explicitly or implicitly authorizes - "provides" for 
- or implicitly and plausibly calls for - "requires" - its creation.77 
73 See Hanna v .  Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,  4 7 1 -72 ( 1 965) . I assume, of course, that the substantive 
law claims are within federal competence under the Constitution. 
74 Burks v.  Lasker, 44 1 U.S.  47 1 ,  477 ( 1 979) . 
75 See, e.g., Texas Indus. ,  Inc. v .  Radcliff Materials, Inc. ,  45 1 U.S.  630 ( 1 98 1 ) ;  United States v.  
Kimbell Foods, Inc. , 440 U.S.  7 1 5  ( 1 979); Burbank, supra note 6, at 755-62. 
76 See Hanna , 380 U.S. at 466 (dictum); Burbank, supra note 6, at 787-9 1 .  
7 7  Burbank, supra note 6, at  759 (footnotes omitted) (criticizing United States v.  Little Lake Mis­
ere Land Co., 4 1 2  U.S. 580, 592-93 ( 1 973) and United States v.  Kimbell Foods, Inc. ,  440 U.S.  7 1 5, 
727 ( 1 979) ) .  For the role of Federal Rules in fashioning federal common law under the Rules of 
Decision Act, see id. at 772-75. 
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It  is also mv view that rec,ent SuDrem::: Court decisions on federal 
' l 
common iaw, albeit not the Court 's  inconsisten t and insupportable state-
men ts a bout the Rules of Decision Act, can be reconciled \Vith this ap­
proach . 78 Ironically, the Court 's  roughest treatment of the Act occurred 
in the De/Costello case,  where the Court made the limitations borrowing 
from the Nati onal Labor Relations Act that led to the subsidiary question 
posed in West ,  79 Confronted with an inflexible view of the Rules of Deci­
sion Act 's  direc tion to apply state law in Justice S tevens '  dissent,80 the 
DelCostello maj ority effectively read it  out of federal question cases . 8 1  As I 
have previously observed , 
[The] suggestion [that the Act is confined to diversity cases] finds no 
support in the language of the Act, in history, or in the Court's  own 
fumblings with the Act in nondiversity cases . The fact that considera­
tions requiring application of state law in diversity cases are not rele­
vant to the elaboration of a federal legislative scheme tells us nothing 
about the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act in the latter context.  
Similarly, the fact that "neither Erie nor the Rules of Decision Act can 
now be taken as establishing a mandatory rule that we apply s tate law in 
federal interstices" does not answer the question whether the Act 
speaks to the circumstances when the filling of those interstices with 
judge-made federal law is permissible.82 
DelCostello thus set the stage for West in more ways than one. Reading 
those two cases, one might think that neither the Rules of D ecision Act 
nor the Rules Enabling Act constrains the Supreme Court when it makes 
law for federal question cases - either in the common-law mode or pro­
spectively - total victory for myths of federalism. 
Yet a view of the Rules of Decision Act that is not " crabbed or 
wooden"83 comfortably yields the same conclusion in De/Costello as does 
traditional federal common law analysis : when federal substantive rights 
are put at risk by a system of borrowed s tate law, the substantive scheme 
requires "otherwise" than that state laws apply.84 As I hope to have 
demonstrated, federal substantive rights are put at risk by a regime of 
borrowed state limitations law. The possibility of inadvertent loss of 
those rights alone supports uniform rules, and the other costs of bor­
rowed state limitations law may also,  Due attention to the separation of 
powers constraints on common-law courts prompts the federal courts to 
find plausible alternatives in other federal s tatutes, and they sometimes 
reach to do so.85 
78 See id. at 758-62 .  
79 See De!Costelio v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. I 51 ( 1 983) ;  supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
80 See De/Costello , 462 U.S. at 1 72-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) . 
8 1  See id. a t  1 59 n. l 3 . 
82 Burbank, supra note 6, at 760 (footnotes omitted) .  See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 
Assocs . ,  Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2771  n .2 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring) .  
83  Robertson v.  Wegmann, 436  U.S .  584, 598  ( 1 978) (Biackmun, J . ,  dissenting) .  
84 Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 44 1 U.S. 47 1 , 479 n.6 ( 1 979) (situations in which "the very application of 
varying state laws would itself be inconsistent with federal interests"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 765-
7 1  (preclusion law for federal question judgments of federal courts ) .  
85 See supra text accompanying notes 1 3-30. 
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Why, then, is the problem with West not of merely academic inter·· 
est?86 If the Court could have formulated a valid common law rule for 
federal question cases involving borrowed l imitations periods, why quib ­
ble about its imputation of such a provision to Rule 3 ?  
First, I d o  not believe that questions o f  technique are or should b e  of 
concern only to academics , at leas t when the lawmaking powers of fed­
eral courts are concerned.  Even if analysis reveals that the Court could 
have reached the same result in West as a matter of federal common law, 
we still should be concerned about the possibility that the Court regards 
the Rules Enabling Act as irrelevant in federal question cases . For we 
now know that existing Federal Rules can have two plain meanings . 
What is to prevent the Court in the future from promulgating Federal 
Rules for application only in federal question cases ? Indeed, that is a 
possibility the Advisory Committee is exploring in connection with Rule 
487 and one that should be explored generally by those who are inter­
ested in reexamining the notion of trans-substantive procedure, the no­
tion that the same rules of procedure should , or can appropriately, apply 
across the whole spectrum of substantive law.88 As prospectively formu­
lated procedure is more closely tied to the substantive law, however, 
both the viability and the importance of effective restrictions on court 
rulemaking should become more apparent .89 
Second, it is not at all clear that the Court could have formulated a 
valid common law rule identical in scope of application to the scope its 
decision in West accorded Rule 3. To be sure, in cases that, there being 
no pertinent Federal Rule, would be treated like West ,  or rather as West 
should have been treated-a garden variety federal common-law case­
the only formal legal barriers under the Court's approach are constitu­
tional .90 There is undoubted federal power and also ,  it would seem, fed­
eral judicial power to fashion a rule defining a limitations period in 
federal question cases, whatever the source of that limitations period. 
The scope given to Rule 3 in West was not confined to cases like West, 
however. The Court's opinion suggests that Rule 3's limitations function 
extends to cases under 42 U .S .C .  Section 1 988 ,  a statute similar to the 
Rules of Decision Act but more narrowly focused and hence not as easy 
to ignore or wish away.9 1 Moreover, it is precisely cases subject to sec-
86 See supra text accompanying note 46. 
87 See Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Ruf£s: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv . 733 
( 1988) .  See also supra note 64; infra note 186. 
88 See infra text accompanying notes 170-89. 
89 See infra text accompanying notes 151-53, 183-89. 
90 See supra text accompanying note 75. In addition to constitutional restraints on federal law­
making by Congress, at some point - a point that is not reached if the Rules of Decision Act is taken 
seriously - constitutional restraints on federal lawmaking by the federal courts are implicated. See 
Burbank, supra note 6, at 756-57 n.l02. 
91 See West v. Conrail, 107 S.  Ct. 1538, 1541 (1987}, quoted supra note 44; id . at 1542 n.6; 
DelRaine v.  Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) . 
Section 1988 provides: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the 
provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the 
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, 
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as 
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not 
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tion 1 988 that have caused the Court to articulate the p ercep cion that 
limitations p eriods are not as simple as they may appear and thus to ex­
tend its borrowing from state law to supplementary rules .92 One may 
treat this aspect of West as dictum, but i t  has the appearance of dictum 
intended to be acted upon as if it were holding. One may also observe 
that the Court has hardly been more consistent or clear in its treatment  
of Section 1 988 than of  the Rules of  Decision Act . 9 3  Let that person try, 
without relying on Rule 3 ,  to reach West 's result under the s tatute in all 
cases to which it applies, but do not hold your breath . 
Finally, on the question of validity,  the reasoning of the Court ' s  deci­
sion in West extends to all federal question cases, including those in 
which there is a directly applicable federal limitations period.94 Cases in 
which the period is not further defined by a statutory rule present no 
problem for a judge-made rule under traditional federal common-law 
analysis ,  or for that matter under the Rules of Decision Act. But what of 
cases in which the federal statute carries its own provision defining when 
the period ceases to run? Paul Carrington has suggested that the Court 
will not permit the application of Rule 3 in such cases,95 but I am not 
sure that I understand why. If a Federal Rule is valid, it  sup ersedes pre­
viously enacted federal statutes with which it is inconsistent.96 Perhaps 
Rule 3 has three plain meanings . In any event, apart from Rule 3, it is 
adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable reme­
dies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or 
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposi­
tion of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the 
party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 198 1 ,  
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 , the court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs. 
42 u.s.c. § 1988 ( 1982) .  
92 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
[T]he cases that require federal courts to borrow the whole state statute of limitations and 
not just the limitations period . . .  are best explained not by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (although they 
were civil rights cases to which section 1988 applies and they did rely in part on that statute) 
but by the inseparability of the time period itself from some (though not necessarily all) 
other provisions of a state's limitations law . . . .  The actual generosity of a statute of limita­
tions depends not only on the nominal period within which suit must be brought but on 
provisions allowing that period to be extended for various reasons, so that if the federal 
court borrows just the period it may in fact be giving plaintiffs more or less time than the 
state that enacted the borrowed statute would have thought appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
DelRaine v.  Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) .  
93 See Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1 9 88, 1 33 U. PA. 
L. REv. 60 1 ( 1985) . But see id. at 620; infra text accompanying note I l l .  
94 The Court's stated holding was limited to cases in which "the absence of an express federal 
statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute." West 
v.  Conrail, 107 S.  Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1  ( 1987) . See supra note 44. But unless Rule 3 has multiple plain 
meanings in federal question cases, i t  furnishes a subsidiary limitations rule in all such cases. That 
appears to have been the expectation of the Court in Walker. See Walker v.  Armco S teel Corp . ,  446 
U.S. 740, 75 1 n. l l  ( l980) , quoted supra note 69. 
95 See P. Carrington, supra note 37, at 27-28. 
96 See 28 U.S.C.  § 2072 ( 1982) ,  quoted supra note 48; Burbank, supra note 66, at 437. Of course, if 
the hypothetical statute had been enacted after 1938, the year Rule 3 became effective, i t  would 
control. 
I 
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clear that the Court could not apply a judge-made rule inconsistent with 
a pertinent and valid federal statutory provision. 
Third, whatever the C ourt's  conception of its common-law powers 
or of the restrictions placed on those powers by Section 1 988,  I doubt 
that, if it had approached the question on a case-by-case basis, which is 
to say statute-by-statute, the Court would have reached the results 
portended by West . One who regards criticism of West as academic may 
be viewing that case  as another example of borrowing, what I have else­
where called reverse incorporation : the use of a Federal Rule in its sub­
stantive aspects as the basis for federal common law.97 Apart from the 
fundamental problem that a federal common-law rule of similar scope of 
application might be invalid, West furnishes ample proof of the dangers 
of that technique. For, although the drafting history of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure indicates that the Reporter and some members of the 
Advisory Committee wished that Rule 3 could furnish a rule to stop the 
running of limitations periods , it also is replete with evidence of contro­
versy on that question,98 controversy that led to the compromise Advi­
sory Committee Note so prominent in the Court' s  decision in Walker and 
so conspicuously ignored in West . 99 In all of this , I can find not the 
slightest hint that, in formulating Rule 3, the Advisory Committee was 
relying on case law that identified the filing of the complaint as the ap­
propriate event for a federal statute of limitations .  Indeed, if the 
rulemakers had been seeking guidance in the cases , they would have 
found a different rule. 1 0o 
Of course, much has changed since those old cases were decided, 
especially arrangements for service of federal process .  Consideration of 
those changes and of lower court cases treating the problem might have 
led the Court to the result it reached, and to the results it signalled, in 
West . In fact, the lower court cases provide little sustenance, 1 0 1  and, 
although the Court did rely on a Federal Rule governing service of pro­
cess in West , the move was part of the sleight of hand to which I have 
referred. 1 02 When the matter is properly analyzed, additional doubts 
arise about West from the perspective of federal common law. 
The federal statute from which the limitations period was borrowed 
in West requires not only that a charge be filed with the General Counsel 
of the NLRB within six months but that it be seroed on the subj ect of the 
complaint within that period. 1 03 In defending the use of Rule 3 instead 
of the borrowed statute' s  service rule, the Court in West resorted to a 
trick it has found useful before, artificially parsing a statute of limitations 
into limitations and service provisions . 1 04 In this case, according to the 
97 See Burbank, supra note 3 ,  at 1 1 58-63 . 
98 See id. at 1 1 59-60 n.6 19 .  
99 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
1 00 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 62 & n.633. 
1 0 1  See, e.g. , Sentry Corp. v .  Harris, 802 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1 986) , cert. denied, 1 07 S .  Ct. 1 624 
( 1 987); United States v .  Wahl, 583 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1978); Bomar v .  Keyes, 1 62 F.2d 1 36 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 ( 1 947).  
1 02 See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.  
1 03 29 u.s.c. § 1 60(b) ( 1 982) .  
1 04 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.  460, 462-63 n. l ( 1965) ; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 73-76. 
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Court, the service pro vision in the s tatute could be disregarded because 
Rule 4 U)  1 05 governs that subject . 1 06 
Rule 4 (j ) ,  which is a s tatute, 1 07 does not, and was not intended to,  
Drovide a rule affecting limitations periods . 1 08 The statutorv service re­
quirement that the Court declined to borrow in West canno� reasonably 
be regarded as anything other than such a rule. 1 09 The result reached in 
West transmogrifies a six-month limitations period into a ten-month pe­
riod .  Even acknowledging irreducible arbitrariness in limitations law, 
that looks like distortion. If s o ,  it would be distortion somewhat different 
from the distortion that, in cases under Section 1 988 ,  has prompted the 
C o urt' s  refusal to borrow piecemeal . 1 1 0 In those cases,  selective borrow­
ing may lead to distortion of state law, the source to which, at least on 
this s ubject, the Court is directed by the s tatute and from which it  is em­
powered to depart only if the borrowed rules discriminate against or 
would cause distortion in federal law, the destination . 1 1 1  I n  a case like 
West ,  1 1 2 one need only b e  concerned about the latter type o f  distortion.  
The Court in West failed satisfactorily to explain, however, why the ten­
month limitations period emerging from its combination of Rules 3 and 
4 U) s erves the policies that caused i t  to borrow the six-month limitation 
period in the first place. 1 1 3 The common-law method might a t  least have 
1 05 SuMMONS: TIME LIMIT FOR SERVICE. If a service of the summons and complaint is not 
made upon a defendant within 1 20 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on 
whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not 
made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without preju­
dice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivi­
sion shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule. 
FED. R.  CIY. P. 4 U ) .  
1 06 The only gap in federal law that we intended to  fill in  DelCostello was the appropriate 
limitations period. We did not intend to replace any part of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure with any part of § 1 O(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Rule 3 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil actin is commenced by filing a com­
plaint with the court, and Rule 4 governs the procedure for effecting service and the period 
within which service must be made . . . .  
West v .  Conrail, 107 S .  Ct. 1 538, 1 54 1  ( 1 987) .  See id. at 1 542 n.7 ("Respondents also argue that 
§ 1 O (b)'s service requirement must be adopted in order to assure that defendants receive prompt 
notice of suit against them. The requirement of timely service in Rule 4U) satisfied this need without 
recourse to the service requirement of § l O(b)" ) .  
1 07 Rule 4U) was added by P.L. No.  97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527, 2528 ( 1 983). 
108 See 1 28 CoNe. REc. H9850 (daily ed.  Dec. 1 5, 1 982) (rtmarks of Rep. Edwards) . Because 
there are no committee reports, this analysis by the bill's sponsor should be accorded great weight. 
1 09 See 29 U.S.C.  § l 60(b) ( 1 982), quoted supra note 40. 
1 1 0 See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 9 1 -92. 
I l l  See Chardon v.  Fumero Soto, 462 U.S .  650, 660-6 1 ( 1 983) ;  Kreimer, supra note 93, at 620. 
1 1 2 When required to displace state law, federal judges have the power to fashion a substitute 
that is fully adequate in light of all of the policies and interests that a common law court 
would consider in making law to govern a matter. They need not blind themselves to the 
procedural opportunities afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .  But, at the 
same time, they should not confuse stated opportunities with stated requirements . . . .  
Burbank, supra note 6, at 7 7 1  (footnotes omitted) .  See id. at 766-67. 
1 1 3 While it is possible that a defendant will not be served with the complaint until ten 
months after the cause of action accrues, this result is not inconsistent with our adoption of 
a six-month statute of limitations for breach of contract, breach of duty of fair representa­
tion claims. See DelCostelio v. Teamsters, 462 U.S .  1 5 1  ( 1 983) . The administrative scheme for 
unfair labor practices only requires that the charge be filed and served within six months of 
the date the cause of action accrued. The defendant does not receive the complaint, if any, 
until the General Counsel has investigated the charge and decided to proceed. Under both 
the administrative procedure for unfair labor practices and the judicial procedure for hybrid 
I 
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evoked more attention to the problem, 1 14 as it might have prompted 
awareness  of other problems that flow from the Court 's  reliance on Fed­
eral Rules in this co ntext.  
Notwithstanding the possibility of dis tortion of substantive law, a 
uniform and trans-substantive federal common-law rule might be justi­
fied if such a rule mitigated the administrability problems,  for l itigants 
and courts , of the sys tem of borrowed limitations law. But such a justifi­
cation is not clear in a case like West and, it would seem, in some of the 
other cases within the reach of its reasoning if not its holding. The cases 
in question involve borrowed limitations periods found in s tatutes that 
also contain rules providing when the periods cease to run. 1 1 5  In such 
cases, the existence of the rule in the same statute as the governing limi­
tations period should prevent the inadvertent loss of federal rights by 
any litigant whose lawyer was consulted in time to comply. The possibil­
ity that a trans-substantive judge-made rule requiring only filing of a 
complaint might preserve even a few meritorious claims from inadvertent 
loss is important. Moreover, a trans-substantive common-law rule re­
quiring only filing would not be difficult to remember once it was 
learned. But the resulting melange of legal sources might seem more 
complicated, a perception that could impose costs of its own. 1 1 6 If so, 
reliance on Rule 3, with its multiple plain meanings , 1 1 7 does not solve the 
problem. 
claims, the statute of limitations and the tolling provisions extinguish stale claims; they 
guarantee that the defendant is not subject to suit for conduct that occurred more than six 
months before the complaining party initiates appropriate legal process, by filing either a 
charge with the NLRB or a complaint in federal court. 
West v.  Conrail, 1 07 S. Ct. 1 538, 1 542 n.7 ( 1 987) (emphasis in original ) .  As noted by the court of 
appeals in West:  
While it is true, as Judge Gibbons notes, that the complaint in an unfair labor practice 
proceeding is filed by the General Counsel after an investigation of the employee's charge, 
it is the filing and service of the charge that notifies the employer of the charge and initiates the dispute 
resolution process in such a proceeding. The filing and service of the complaint performs the 
same function in a hybrid labor suit like the one before us. Section I O(b) promotes the 
prompt resolution of labor disputes by requiring an early initiation of the dispute resolution 
process and DelCostello teaches that this policy should be implemented in hybrid labor suits 
as well. That policy is best served by borrowing the service requirement, as well as the 
filing requirement, of Section 1 O(b) .  
West v .  Conrail, 780 F.2d 3 6 1 ,  363-64 (3d Cir. 1 985) (emphasis added), rev 'd, 1 0'7 S .  Ct. 1 538 
( 1 987) .  See also infra note 1 1 4 .  
1 1 4  In American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 823 F.2d 466 ( 1 1 th Cir. 
1 987),  the court of appeals borrowed the three-month limitations period in the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 2  ( 1 982) ,  to govern a suit to vacate an arbitration award that was brought under the 
Postal Reorganization Act of 1 970, Pub. L. No. 9 1 -375, 84 Stat. 7 1 9  ( 1 970) (codified in relevant part 
at 39 U.S.C. § 1 208(b) ( 1 982)). Although th� Federal Arbitration Act requires service of a notice of 
motion to vacate within the three-month period, the court of appeals felt compelled by West to reject 
the borrowing of that subsidiary rule: 
Whatever our doubts about adding an additional four months onto a three-month (or even 
six-month) limitations period specifically chosen for its brevity, that decision is no longer 
ours to make. Therefore, if the plaintiff filed its complaint to commence the action within 
three months (which it  did) , and effected proper service within 1 20 days of filing (which it 
did) , then the actions are timely. 
823 F.2d at 477 (footnotes omitted). 
1 1 5 See, e.g., id. 
1 1 6 It might not, however, be more complicated. 
1 1 7 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70, 94-97. 
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If anyone continues to doubt that technique matters , a few minutes 
with a recent Fourth Circuit decision shouid do the trick. Whatever re­
s trictions the Enabling Act imposes on Federal Rules in federal court, I 
hope we can agree that neither the Enabling Act 1 1 8  nor the Federal Rules 
themselves 1 1 9 authorize their imposition on s tate courts . If the C ourt in 
West had thought of that and adverted to the fact that most federal claims 
are within the concurrent jurisdiction of s tate courts, it should also have 
realized that Rule 3 was not a panacea on the question before it. Because 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in state court litiga­
tion, only a uniform federal common-law rule, binding on state courts as 
well as federal, can yield true uniformity. Here again, however, looking 
at the problem from the perspective of federal common law raises doubts 
whether uniformity, let alone trans-substantive uniformity, i s  all that it 
appears . 
The plaintiff in Cannon v. Kroger Co. 1 20 sued her employer and her 
union in a hybrid section 30 I! unfair representation action in s tate court. 
As permitted under North Carolina law, she commenced that action on 
the last day of the s ix-month period not by filing a complaint, but by the 
issuance of a summons upon her application "stating the nature and pur­
pose of the action and requesting permission to file [her] complaint 
within 20 days" and a court order "stating the nature and purpose of the 
action and granting the reques ted permission . "  1 2 1 After removal of the 
action to federal court, the district judge dismissed it  as barred by the 
(borrowed) six-month limitations period. On appeal, a panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plain­
tiff's  failure to file a "complaint" in accordance with Rule 3 within the 
s ix-month period was fatal . 1 22 Rehearing and rehearing en bane were 
denied, 1 23 with judge Murnaghan writing a lengthy and vigorous 
dissent. 1 24 
1 1 8 See supra note 48. The Federal Rules there authorized are for "the district courts and courts 
of appeals of the United States."  
1 19 These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in a l l  suits of a civil 
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions 
stated in Rule 8 1 .  They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 . .  
1 20 832 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1 987}, reh 'g and reh 'g en bane denied, 837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1 988) . 
1 2 1  N.C.  R. C1v. P. 3 .  See Cannon, 832 F.2d at 304. 
1 22 After West, there can be no question that commencement of a "hybrid" claim brought in 
district court is to be assessed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Unlike appellant, we can perceive no justification for allowing a different result simply be­
cause the underlying action is initiated in a state court. The substantive rights involved 
remain purely federal in nature. Moreover, the choice of a forum in no way diminishes the 
subtle balance of interests noted in De/Costello as a justification for uniformity. The applica­
tion of alternative state law procedures must inevitably intrude into the balance and 
threaten the goal of uniform adjudication. We conclude, therefore, that the statute of limi­
tations applicable to hybrid actions runs until the action is properly commenced under the 
dictates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Cannon , 832 F.2d at 305-06. One member of the panel dissented. See id. at 306-07 (Smalkin, DJ. ,  
dissenting) . 
1 23 Cannon v. Kroger Co. ,  837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1 988). 
1 24 !d. at 660-70 (Murnaghan, J . ,  dissenting from denial of rehearing en bancl . 
l 
' 
\ 
( 
I 
l 
I 
r 
1 988) RULES AND DISCRETION 7 1 1  
The Court o f  Appeals' decision in Cannon i s  remarkable not so much 
for imposing Rule 3 on a state court, as for imposing Rule 8 (a) , which 
defines what a "pleading which sets forth a claim for relief" in federal 
court shall contain. 1 25 Whatever its power in other cases of borrowed 
limitations law, the Court in West had the power to fashion a uniform 
common-law rule for the hybrid federal claims at issue in that case, and 
its reliance on Rule 3 can be excused as shorthand. 1 26 Moreover, it 
would not do to have one rule defining when a federal limitations period 
stops running for cases brought in federal court and a consequentially 
different rule for cases brought in state court. The Court also has the 
power, although it has been reluctant to use it , to displace state-law rules 
in state court litigation on federal claims when those rules are hostile to 
or inconsistent wi th a scheme of federal rights . 1 27 In that aspect of Can­
non , the Fourth Circuit can be seen as merely extending the Court' s  
shorthand reference to  Rule 3 .  
Accepting the proposition that the Court could fashion a uniform 
rule for hybrid actions ,  binding in state as well as federal court, the ques­
tion becomes whether it could also require that the paper filed within the 
statutory period, which Rule 3 calls a "complaint ,"  satisfy the require­
ments of Rule 8 .  That is the effect of Cannon . 1 28 This result is difficult if 
1 25 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain ( l )  a short and plain 
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court 
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, 
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and 
(3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of 
several different types may be demanded. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a). 
1 26 See supra text following note 89. 
1 27 See, e.g. ,  Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 ( 1 980); Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R .R . ,  342 
U.S.  359 ( 1 952) ;  Brown v.  Western Ry. ,  338 U.S.  294 ( 1 949); Davis v .  Wechsler, 263 U.S .  22 ( 1 923) .  
See also Burbank, supra note 6, at  805- 1 7. In displacing particular state-law rules, or requiring use of 
a uniform federal common-law rule, in state court litigation, the Court is bound by the Rules of 
Decision Act. See id . at 809 n .366; supra note 8 .  
After this paper was delivered, the Supreme Court decided two cases that bear on the problem 
of federal law in state court. One of them, Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v .  Morgan, 1 08 S.  Ct. 
1 837 ( 1 988) , held that the availability of prejudgment interest in a state court FELA action is a 
matter of federal law. The other, Felder v. Casey, l 08 S. Ct. 2302 ( 1 988), held that a state notice of 
claim statute could not be applied in a state court § 1 983 action. Felder is of particular interest 
because, although using the language of "preemption,"  see id. at 2307, it confirms the potential of 
the general approach to federal common law that I have advocated. See Burbank, supra note 6. Felder 
thus also suggests the bankruptcy of the Court's approach to the full faith and credit  statute. See id. 
at 805-22. 
1 28 Appellant's alternative contention that the state summons issued pursuant to North Caro­
lina Rule 3 was somehow equivalent to a complaint under the Federal rules is unpersuasive. 
A valid complaint under the Federal Rules must satisfy, inter alia, the demands of Rule 
8(a) (2) by including a "plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief." The state summons issued to defendants below fell significantly short of this 
requirement. 
Cannon v.  Kroger, 832 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1 987) (footnote omitted) , reh 'g and reh 'g en bane denied, 
837 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1 988). In referring to the "state summons," the court of appeals evidently 
intended the "Application and Order Extending Time to File Complaint," which was served with the 
summons. Ms. Cannon's application stated as the nature and purpose of the action: "Recovery of 
damages and other relief by employee for Union's breach of its duty of fair representation and em­
ployer's breach of collective bargaining agreement under Section 30 l of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1 85 ."  Application and Order Extending Time to File Complaint, Can­
non v. Kroger, No. 86-CVS- 1 1 76 (March 7, 1 986) . 
7 1 2  NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 :693 
not impossible to square with the Court ' s  traditional approach to federai 
common law and radically inconsistent with the Court's  approach to fed­
eral law in state courts , which has been largely sui generis . 1 29 
For good or ill, West makes i t  clear that actual notice to a defendant 
within the limitations period is  not important to the policies of the (bor­
rowed) statute of limitations . 1 30 Ms .  Cannon filed her complaint within 
20 days , and it was served on the defendants within 30 days , of the issu­
ance of the summons . The defendants therefore had notice of the claims 
brought against them long before they might have had notice if  the ac­
tion had been brought originally in federal court, where Rule 4 U )  allows 
1 20 days for service of process . 1 3 1 In that light, the precise content of 
the filed paper that commences the lawsuit is irrelevant. Under tradi­
tional federal common law analysis or a Rules of Decision Act approach, 
there is not a sufficient basis to displace the North Carolina system, let 
alone to impose on North Carolina courts a uniform federai definition of 
a complaint. 1 32 Moreover, the administrability costs of such a rule for 
people desiring to litigate in s tate court are significant. 1 3 3  Under a 
"preemption" approach, a uniform federal rule can only be harder to 
justify . 1 34 
Just as visions of uniformity may have blinded the Court in West ,  so 
may they have prevented the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
from seeing the endpoint of the course on which it  embarked. Imposing 
the requirements of Rules 3 and 8 on state courts will not ensure uni­
formity in the limitations period applicable to a federal claim. Conceiva­
bly, a state might permit a period longer than 120 days for service of 
process .  If so, it  is possible that the Supreme Court would require that a 
s tate court plaintiff follow Federal Rule 4U) . Is it not more l ikely that the 
Court would look to the facts to determine whether notice was given so 
late as to be inconsistent with the policies of the governing l imitations 
period? If so, Ms. Cannon would have additional reason to wonder what 
happened to her. 
Whatever the accuracy of a would-be reformer's description of fed­
eral practice and procedure under the Conformity Act, there can be no 
doubt that to " the average lawyer," federal limitations law today "is San­
skrit. " 1 35 Nor can there be any doubt that, notwithstanding the Supreme 
1 29 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 805- 1 7 ;  supra note 1 27 .  
1 30 See supra text accompanying notes 1 03- 1 4 .  
1 3 1  See Cannon, 837 F .2d at 66 1 & n.3 (Murnagham, J . ,  dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
bane) . See also id. at 662 n.4, 666 & n . 1 1 .  
1 3 2  See id. a t  663-64, 666-68. Cf Burbank. supra note 6 ,  a t  8 10- 1 2  (uniform federal preclusion 
rules for state court judgments not justified). 
1 33 See Cannon, 837 F.2d at 668 (Murnaghan, J. ,  dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) . 
The problem is not, however, confined to litigants who fear that their state court action may be 
removed to federal court and for that reason attempt " to comply with both sets of rules ."  /d. As 
Judge Murnaghan elsewhere demonstrates, removal is irrelevant. See id. at 664; FED. R. Crv. P. 8 1 .  
The panel opinion in Cannon represents that court's conclusion as to the law applicable in a case 
litigated wholly within the state court system and, implicitly, its prediction of what the Supreme 
Court would hold in reviewing a state court decision under 28 U.S.C.  § 1 257 ( 1 982) .  See supra note 
!22 ;  note 1 27 and accompanying text. Cf Burbank, supra note 6, at 8 1 1 - 1 2  (administrability 
problems of uniform federal preclusion rules for state court judgments). 
1 34 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 807- 1 0; supra note 1 27 .  
1 35 See supra text accompanying notes 1 -4 .  
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::::ourt's efforts to reduce the costs entailed by a system o f  borro·wed state 
imitations law, truly effective reform will come, if  at all, only when Con­
�ress determines comprehensively to address the problem. For, even an 
�xpansive view of the common-law powers of federal courts confronts 
:ontinuing concern about charges of "judicial legislation" i 36 that, in an 
1rea of irreducible arbitrariness ,  cannot be answered by reference to leg­
siative policies. And not even the Court that decided West i s  likely to 
�ssay limitations periods in Federal Rules . 
Studying the Supreme Court' s  responses to the problem is nonethe­
,ess ins tructive. We see in those responses a quest for s implicity and pre­
:lictability, and for adjudication of claims on the merits ,  that recalls the 
�tated goals of those who sought to replace the Conformity Act with 
::ourt rules of practice and procedure. l 3 7  We also see a quest for uni­
formity, one that is much easier to understand and defend than the s imi­
lar quest of proponents of the Enabling Act, 1 38 because it  concerns only 
federal substantive claims and, moreover, matters bearing so directly on 
those claims as to "define or limit" 1 39 their very existence. Finally, in 
West ,  we see the triumph of the trans-substantive solution, discovered in 
that compendium of trans-substantive solutions known as the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Supreme Court's responses to the problem of federal limita­
tions law thus follow the plot line of modern federal procedure. I have 
asked you to pay close attention to the last chapter, because it  is ,  I be­
lieve, the most important. In moving from a goal of uniformity to a re­
sult of trans-substantive uniformity ,  the Court in West offered no more 
explanation of why one must accompany the other than did those who 
gave us the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 40 Even in the substantive 
1 36 UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. ,  383 U.S .  696, 702-04 ( 1 966). See supra text accompanying 
notes 6, 23-26. 
1 3 7  The 1 926 Senate report on the bill that, with the change of one word, was ultimately passed as 
the Rules Enabling Act of 1 934, enumerated the general purposes of the grant of rulemaking power 
to the Supreme Court as follows: 
First, to make uniform throughout the United States the forms of process, writs, plead­
ings, and motions and the practice and procedure in the district courts in actions at law. It 
is believed that if this were its only advantage that [sic] lawyers and litigants would find, in 
uniformity alone, a tremendous advance over the present system. 
Second, these general rules, if wisely made, would be a long step toward simplicity, a 
most desirable step in view of the chaotic and complicated condition which now exists. 
Third, it would tend toward the speedier and more intelligent disposition of the issues 
presented in law actions and toward a reduction in the expense of litigation. 
Fourth, it would make it more certain that if a plaintiff has a cause of action he would 
not be turned out of court upon a technicality and without a trial upon the very merits of  
the case; and, likewise, if the defendant had a just defense he  would not be  denied by  any 
artifice of [sic] the opportunity to present it . 
S .  REP. No. 1 1 74, 69th Cong., 1 st Sess . 1-2 ( 1 926) . See, e g., Report of the Committee on Unifonn judicial 
Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509 ( 1 920); Burbank, supra note 3 ,  at 1 067-68 & n.236; Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective , 1 35 U .  PA. L. REv. 
909, 948-61  ( 1 987).  
1 38 See supra note 1 37. 
1 39 S. REP. No. 1 1 74, supra note 1 37,  at 1 0  (quoting 3 REPORT OF THE BoARD OF STATUTORY 
CoNSOLIDATION ON THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK 477 
( 1 9 1 5) ) ;  Burbank, supra note 3 ,  at 1 1 22 .  
140 See Burbank, supra note 3 ,  at  1 1 35-36 & n.539. The debate chronicled there concerned the 
meaning of "general rules" as used in the Enabling Act, see supra note 48, and in particular whether 
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context that brought it forth, the trans-substantive solution is problem­
atic in terms of the policies animating the governing substantive law . 1 4 1 
Moreover, although the benefits of simplicity and predictability afforded 
by a trans-substantive solution might be thought to outweigh the costs of 
any distortion, it is  not clear that West 's solution promises those benefits 
for federal court litigation, 142 and it  surely does not when extended to 
s tate court litigation . 1 43 
Perhaps ,  however, I am being unfair, and we are or should be talking 
about different books. Limitations law has always been difficult to char­
acterize, 1 44 and its substantive implications are hard to miss ,  if not to 
ignore. 1 45 In addition, Rule 3 ,  as interpreted in West , makes a clear pol­
icy choice that has predictable consequences for a s tatute of limita­
tions . 1 46 Further s till, the administrability costs of borrowed law are 
obvious and perhaps different in kind from comparable costs in a system 
that, by and large, eschews borrowing. 1 4 7  What can we learn from West 
about real procedure , about "adjective law?" 148 Moreover, what can we 
learn from that case about really uniform federal procedure? 
An answer to some of these possible objections to the comparison 
lies in West itself, where the Supreme Court manifested no interest in the 
question of characterization posed by the Enabling Act. A more satisfac­
tory answer lies in a perception that may help to explain the Court's fail­
ure to pause: the perception " that 'procedure' and 'substance' are 
elusive words that must be approached in context, and that there can be 
no one, indeed any, bright line to mark off their respective preserves . " 1 49 
In much of today's  litigation landscape, procedure is adj ectival to sub­
s tantive law in the same way that, in negligence law, reasonable is to 
man. 1 50 In other words, "real procedure" is hard to find. 
Possible objections based on the atypical nature of Rule 3 ,  read to 
make a policy choice in the limitations area, or on the supposedly unique 
the Act contemplated uniformity or would accommodate rules requiring strict conformity to state 
law. The question whether uniformity necessarily entails trans-substantive uniformity was not ad­
dressed, probably because it was assumed. See Subrin, supra note 1 3  7, at 956-6 1 ,  995-96. 
1 4 1 See supra text accompanying notes 1 03- 1 3 . The problem of distortion is even more serious 
when Rule 3 is used for other statutory limitation periods. See supra note 1 14 .  
142  See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 5- 1 7 .  
1 4 3  See supra note 1 3 3  and accompanying text. 
144 Compare Goad v .  Celotex Corp . ,  83 1  F .2d 508, 5 1 1  (4th Cir. 1 987),  cert. denied, 1 08 S .  Ct .  287 1 
( 1 988) ("principal purpose of limiting statutes is the prevention of stale claims [from the perspective 
of courts] ,  and . . .  the repose of defendants is merely an incidental benefit. . . .  ") with F . jAMES & G. 
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4 . 1 6, at 2 1 8- 1 9  (3d ed. 1 985) (ordering " (p]rotection of a defendant 
from stale claims" and " (p]rotection of defendant from insecurity" ahead of "[p]rotection of courts 
from the burden of stale claims" in policy analysis). 
145  See supra text accompanying notes 67-72, 
1 46 See id. ; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 60. 
147  But see FED. R. Civ. P. 64, 69; Burbank, supra note 3 ,  at 1 145-47 .  
148  "Law reformers have long assured us  that procedure i s  technical, details-in short, adjective 
law. Whatever the accuracy of those labels as to other matters, only in Wonderland do they describe 
rules of preclusion." Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 
CoRNELL L. REv. 658, 662 ( 1 985) (footnote omitted). 
1 49 Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 1 88. 
1 50 See, e.g. , Burbank, The Costs of Complexiiy (Book Review) , 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 463,  1 4 7 1 -76 
( 1 987) .  
' 
I 
r 
! 
( 
I 
I 
[ 
l 
1 988] RULES AND DISCRETION 7 1 5  
adminis trability problems of  a system o f  borrowed law are more interest­
ing, but not for reasons that those tempted to make them might  think. 
I t  is not surprising that, with some notable exceptions ,  the trend of 
modern procedural law has been away from rules that make policy 
choices towards those that confer on trial courts a substantial amount of 
normative discretion . 1 5 1  For once one has settled upon trans-substantive 
rules as the best way of achieving uniformity, simplicity and predictabil­
ity, and once one acknowledges the impact of procedure on the substan­
tive law, concerns about either the legitimacy of the enterprise 1 52 or its 
efficacy 153 push in that direction. Moreover, in a system dominated, as 
modem American procedure has been dominated, by equity, l 54 the 
avoidance of prospective policy choices holds the promise that justice 
may be done, with procedure its servant rather than master. 1 55 
Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad 
hoc decision-making by trial judges are uniform and hence trans-sub­
stantive in only the most trivial sense. 1 56 More important, the banner of 
s implicity and predictability under which they fly 1 57 is by now false adver­
tising. There is little that is simple or predictable about contemporary 
federal procedure. Litigants and courts need more guidance than the 
Federal Rules provide, and to find it they must turn to a bewildering 
array of local rules, s tanding orders , and standard operating procedures, 
to say nothing of case law. 1 58 Too often they must turn to the judge 
herself. 1 59 The Federal Rules may largely eschew borrowing, 1 60 but they 
are nonetheless heavily in debt. Ours is a system that would have ap­
palled those who hoped for "speedier and more intelligent disposition of 
the issues . . .  and . . .  a reduction in the expense of l itigation." 1 6 1 
Attempts to discipline this chaos,  such as the admirable project cur­
rently studying local court rules , 1 62 may not succeed in reducing the 
multiplicity of sources of rules .  They may simply drive the rules further 
1 5 1  See id. at 14 74 . There is also a trend in favor of greater allocative discretion. See, e.g. , FED. R. 
Crv. P .  52 .  
1 52 See Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1474-76; Subrin, supra note 1 37 ,  at 960-6 1 .  
1 53 See Burbank, supra note 27,  at 3 1 1 ,  324 (contrasting problems of foreseeability and risks of 
inappropriate procedural choices posed for trans-substantive rules with those posed for rules to 
implement a single substantive scheme) . 
1 54 See Subrin, supra note 1 37 ;  Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1469-70, 1 478-80; Burbank, The Chan­
cellor 's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 3 1  ( 1 988) .  
1 55 See Clark, The Handmaid of justice, 23  WAsH. U.L.Q 297 ( 1 938); Subrin, supra note 1 37 ,  at 961 -
82.  
1 56 Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 473-74. 
1 57 See supra text accompanying note 1 37 .  
1 58 The ninety-four federal district courts currently have an aggregate of 4,998 local rules, 
not including thousands of "sub-rules," standing orders and standard operating proce­
dures. These rules are extraordinarily diverse, and the numbers continue to grow rapidly. 
To give one stark example, the Central District of California . . .  has 3 1  local rules with 434 
"sub-rules," supplemented by approximately 275 standing orders . . . .  
Coquillette, Introduction to The Special Invitational Conference on Local Court Rules 2 (Nov. 1 2 -
1 3 ,  1 987) .  
1 59 See Burbank, The Chancellor 's Boot, supra note 1 54, at 33 .  
1 60 See supra text accompanying note 14 7 .  
1 6 1  S .  REP. No. 1 1 74, supra note 1 37 .  See Burbank, supra note 66, a t  425-27. 
1 62 See, e.g., 1987 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 79; supra note 1 58 .  
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from official view, and hence from the view of litigants and their lawyers . 
\Norse, they may drive judges further from rules . Interstate federal prac­
tice cannot be any easier today than it was when proponents of the En­
abling Act championed the cause of one interstate lawyer as against that 
of a hundred who stayed at home, 1 63 but the costs imposed by its com­
plexity are surely more widely felt . 1 64 In any event, intrastate federal 
practice is itself complex and risky business ,  particularly in courts whose  
invocation of  sanctions 1 65 and other "procedural" roadblocks 1 66 signals 
a reversal in the master-servant relationship . 1 67 
If  one admits that only a lawyer can think about procedure and sub­
stantive law as if they were discrete preserves ,  that modern federal proce­
dure is complex and in large measure unpredictable, and that the Federal 
Rules are in similar measure only superficially uniform and trans-sub­
s tantive, alternative reform strategies appear in sharper focus . Two such 
strategies have dominated recent efforts of the rulemakers and debate in 
the l iterature. One is to enhance the power of trial judges to manage 
litigation. 1 68 Another is to enhance incentives for people to avoid litiga­
tion. 1 69 Both represent steps in the flight from law.  
There is another way, one that takes seriously the interrelationship 
of procedure and substantive law, that adopts a comparative view of sim­
plicity and predictability, that does not equate uniformity with trans-sub­
s tantivity, and that is  animated by faith in a liberal view of law and hence 
of rights. 1 70 If we should have s tanding orders for RICO cases, 1 7 1 why 
should we not have uniform rules that govern such cases, and those l ike 
them, in the respects in which they are deemed atypical, either because of their 
procedural requirements or the requirements of the substantive law? 1 72 
1 63 Senator Thomas Walsh, the bere nair of Enabling Act proponents, declared himself "for the 
one hundred who stay at home as against the one who goes abroad" as early as 1 9 1 5. Simplification of 
judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary , 
64th Cong., 1 s t  Sess. 28 ( 1 9 1 5) .  See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 063-64. 
1 64 "There is a growing body of specialized federa1 law and a more mobile federal bar, accompa­
nied by an increased demand for specialized legal services regardless of state boundaries ."  Frazier v. 
Heebe, 1 07 S.  Ct. 2607, 2 6 1 2  n.7 ( 1 987) . 
1 65 See, e.g. , FED. R. Crv. P. 1 1 , 37; Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1478.  
1 66 See, e.g. , DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 82 1 F.2d 1 1 1  (2d Cir.) ,  cert. denied, 
1 08 S. Ct. 455 ( 1 987) (federal civil rights and other claims precluded by unreviewed state adminis· 
trative proceedings) ;  Burbank, supra note 6, at 8 1 7-22 . 
1 67 See supra note 1 48 and accompanying text; infra note 1 70 and accompanying text. 
1 68 See, e.g. , FED. R. Crv. P. 1 6; Resnik, Managerial judges , 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 ( 1 982) ;  Burbank, 
supra note 1 50, at 1476-83 .  
1 69 See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 483-87; Burbank, supra note 66, at 432 & n.40. 
I 70 More generally, it is judges who have been closing the courthouse door, not Congress. 
That they have been doing it under a system of equity rules may make the suggestion that 
we consider putting more law in a merged system seem not "stingier," as Judge Weinstein 
describes it, but more liberal, at least in the sense of valuing rights. 
Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot , supra note 1 54,  at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
1 7 1  See, e.g. , Patti v .  Seider), No. 87-0223 (E.D. Pa. April 1 6, 1 987) ("RICO Case Standing 
Order") .  
1 72 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would continue to govern matters not deemed to re­
quire special rules. Cf Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing on H. R. 2633 and H. R. 3550 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary,  99th Cong., 
1 st Sess. 9, 2 1  n. l 2  ( 1 985) (statement of Stephen B .  Burbank) (noting Congress'  failure to advert to 
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If civil rights cases really d o  require special pleading rules , 1 73 perhaps 
they also require other special rules that accommodate their dis tinctive 
attributes . If we should have an unofficial /Vfanual For Complex Litiga­
tion , 1 74 why should we not think about a separate set of procedural rules 
for complex cases, as well as a system for identifying such cases ? 1 75 
Objections to such a strategy are predictable. Some will conj ure up 
the writ system and the forms of action, without mentioning, let alone 
comparatively evaluating, the costs of the rival system that triumphed in 
1 938, 1 76 or crediting us with the ability to avoid the sacrifice of substan­
tive rights at the altar of procedural purity . 1 77 We need to see 
whether it is possible to merge law and equity, adversariness and j udi­
cial control, without submerging one or the other. The enterprise will 
reveal substantial-perhaps unacceptable-costs ,  but the relevant 
comparison is not just the costs of the equity-based procedure initi­
ated in 1 938. . . . [F]ederal j udges are moving further beyond equity, 
in some cases returning to practices previously rej ected, even at the 
trial stage.1 78 
Others , taking a page from Thomas Walsh, the chief antagonist of 
the Enabling Act, will s tress the enormity of the enterprise and the inevi­
table complexity of any product.  1 79 We are constantly reminded that 
"judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded, " 1 80 but often the quip 
more accurately describes the time it takes to sell a proposed reform than 
the time invested in conceiving it . 1 8 1 In any case, simplicity is a compara­
tive good, and I trust  that my critics will not want to buy false 
advertising. 1 82 
the "possible need for specialized procedure . . .  when it enacts legislation" and proposing " Proce­
dural Impact Statement"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 83 1 -32 (same) . 
For other suggestions that we should consider departures from the norm of trans-substantive 
procedure, e.g. , Subrin, supra note 1 37, at 977, 985, 99 1 ,  995-96; Rosenberg, The Federal Rules After 
Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 243 ( 1 984) . 
1 73 See, e.g. , United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1 980) . But see Marcus, The 
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433 ( 1 986) . See also 
supra note 1 72.  
1 74 MANUAL FoR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) ( 1 985) . 
1 75 On the dangers of using complex litigation as a norm for trans-substantive rules, see Sher­
man, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Complex Litigation (Book Review) , 63 TEX. L. REv. 72 1 ,  
744-45 ( 1 984) ; Friedenthal, A Divirkd Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure , 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 8 1 3  ( 1 98 1 ) .  See also Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 465, 1 468. 
1 76 See Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 479. 
1 77 One of the purposes of the bill that became the Enabling An was to "make it more certain 
that if a plaintiff has a cause of action he would not be turned out of court upon a technicality and 
without a trial upon the very merits of the case." S. REP. No. 1 1 74, supra note 1 37 .  
1 78 Burbank, supra note 1 50, at 1 4  79. For  a discussion of some of the costs of this approach by 
one who is equally aware of the costs of the current system, see Hazard, Forms of Action Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 628 ( 1 988) . 
1 79 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1 088-89, 1 1 1 1 - 1 2 .  
1 80 A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF jUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix (A.  Vanderbilt ed. 
1 949) . 
1 8 1  What we know as the " Field Code" was prepared in an astonishingly short period of time. See 
Reppy, The Field Codification Concept,  in DAVID DuDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY EssAYS 33-34 ( 1 949) . The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were prepared in approximately two and one half years. See Chan­
dler, Some Major Advances in the Federal judicial System, 1922- 1947, 3 1  F.R.D. 307, 49 1 -98 ( 1 963).  
1 82 See supra text accompanying note 15 7.  
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An objection to a strategy of reform of this sort not likely to be 
stated , but very powerful ,  is the objection that it would require proce­
dural reformers to become conversant with the substantive law, or at 
least to work with those who are so conversant. I t  would thus have obvi­
ous and potentially far-reaching professional and political implications, 
threatening myths of expertise 1 83 on the one hand and of legitimacy 1 84 
on the other. Effective procedural reform will not come from a small 
group of "experts , "  nor will it come from the Supreme Court alone. We 
need partnerships in determining how the field should be carved up for 
study, in studying it, and in implementing proposed reforms .  Existing 
projects furnish possible models for the work, 1 85 and we need to think 
about other models .  We also need to show more respect, if not for Con­
gress, then for democratic ideals that we elsewhere profess . 1 86 
West may be "such a little baby, "  1 87 but i t  holds, at least for me, 
lessons that transcend the limitations context. To some the case may 
illustrate not the promise of formalism but its folly. Careful analysis 
reveals ,  however, that the problem in West is not formalism but rather a 
particular solution, itself problematic, generalized by reason of the trans­
substantive scope of the Federal Rules. It is time to bring problems both 
of scope and of values to the surface to see whether we are, in fact, capa­
ble of generalizations, of rules,  worthy of the name. 1 88 
In his inaugural lecture at Oxford, Professor Atiyah concluded 
with observations that well describe the dilemma of modern federal 
procedure: 
I have said that perhaps one reason for the trend I have described is 
that it is easier to conceal a diversity of values when principles are j et­
tisoned in favor of individualized justice. But how long can this pro­
cess of concealment last? At a time when the ideal of egalitarianism 
rides as high as it does today, it is supremely ironical that we should at 
the same time be embracing discretion and rej ecting principles ; for 
1 83 See, e.g. , Subrin, supra note 1 37, at 968-69. 
1 84 See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note 3, at l 068, 1 194-97. 
1 85 One existing project that could accommodate a study of the sort envisioned is the American 
Law Institute's Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process I njuries. See AMERI­
CAN LAw INST. , 1 986 ANNUAL REPORT 1 5, 1 7 . 
An existing project that actually has as its goal the exploration of means to integrate substance 
and process is underway at Northeastern University School of Law. The work involves collaboration 
among Professors Judith Olans Brown and Phyllis Tropper Bauman, specialists in the field of em­
ployment discrimination, and Professor Stephen Subrin, a specialist in procedure. 
1 86 See Burbank, The Chancellor 's Boot , supra note 1 54 ,  at 34 . The proposal is decidedly not that 
Congress assume primary responsibility for prospective procedural law. It may be useful,  however, 
to consider a two-track system for rules, involving "the submission to Congress of all provisions in 
the area of procedure, broadly defined, that are thought to be needed, divided into two groups: 
those subject to congressional review and those requiring congressional approval . "  Burbank, supra 
note 3 ,  at 1 1 95 n.  775. This is in fact the approach suggestd by Paul Carrington for the amendment 
of Rule 4 .  See Carrington, supra note 87, at [Ed. Tan 5 1 -55] .  
187 In a discussion about the original Advisory Committee's power to recommend Federal Rules 
on matters of evidence, Professor Morgan observed: "I  think, if you put that up to the Court, they 
would say, as the servant girl said, 'It is such a little baby.' (Laughter) . "  4 Proceedings of Meeting of 
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States 974 
(Feb. 20-25, 1 936) (available in Harvard Law School Library) . See Burbank, supra note 3,  at 1 1 44 
n.566. 
1 88 See G. HAZARD, RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 9- 1 I ( 1 963) .  
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this process must of necessi�y encourage and legitimize a greater ine­
quality of treatment in the j udicial process . The diversity of values 
underlying judicial decisions is thus concealed only by encouraging a 
departure from the ideal of equality. 1 89 
7 1 9  
I assume that equality i s  a goal o f  procedural justice a s  i t  i s  o f  substantive 
justice . I also assume that a redistribution of power may be necessary if 
equality is to be achieved . Ultimately, the fate of effective procedural 
reform may turn on the willingness of federal judges to share some of 
their power so that procedure may once again be the servant of justice, 
procedural and substantive. 
1 89 Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the judicial Process and the Law, 65 
IowA L. REv. 1 249, 1 2 7 1  ( 1 980). 
